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PAPER ABSTRACT: After highly fragmented civil wars, order is often secured through the selective co-optation of rebel field commanders and atomized insurgents. This paper presents a formal model of civil war settlement as a coalition formation game between various regime and rebel factions. This approach emphasizes the ability of installed civilian rulers to lure warlords into the state based on promises of future wealth, then use divide-and-rule tactics to pit different warlord factions against one another. Quantitative and qualitative data from Tajikistan, including an original data set of warlord incorporation and regime purges during wartime reconstruction, are used to evaluate the model. Research Data Curation Program, UC San Diego, La Jolla, 92093-0175 (https://lib.ucsd.edu/rdcp) Driscoll, Jesse (2016): Data from: Commitment Problems or Bidding Wars? Rebel Fragmentation as Peace Building. UC San Diego Library Digital Collections. https://doi.org/10.6075/J0KS6PHX Driscoll, Jesse. 2012. Commitment problems or bidding wars? Rebel fragmentation as peace-building. Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 56, No. 1, 118-149. doi: 10.1177/0022002711429696 This component contains the code and data needed to reproduce Table 2 from "Commitment Problems or Bidding Wars? Rebel Fragmentation as Peace Building", including an original data set of regime purges against field commanders in post-civil war Tajikistan from 1992–2006.
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Dataset
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Civil war Game theory Coalitions State-building Central Asia
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